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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
THE EXCLUSIONS SECTION OF THE UNINSURED
MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT OF THE
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY
INTRODUCTION
The uninsured motorist endorsement of the automobile insurance
policy is a form of first party coverage intended to protect injured
insureds whose misfortune at the hands of a motorist without liability
insurance would mean that they would otherwise be uncompensated.
The exclusions section of the uninsured motorist endorsement of the
automobile insurance policy attempts to qualify the general insuring
agreement, which, "[Reduced] to simple terms, says that the company
agrees to pay the insured all sums which he or his legal representative
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages for bodily injury, sick-
ness or disease, caused by accident, arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance or use of an uninsured automobile."'
The exclusions sections cannot be fully understood without an ex-
amination of the other sections of the uninsured motorist endorsement,
because there is a considerable amount of overlap. For example, a de-
termination of whether a person qualifies as an insured under the en-
dorsement involves an examination of both the definitions and the
exclusions sections of the policy, and in considering the reference to
workmen's compensation in the exclusions section, it is necessary to
examine the "set-off" provisions in the limits of liability section.
The exclusions section of the standard2 uninsured motorist endorse-
ment is divided into three distinct parts. Generally, one part states that
coverage will be excluded if the insured is occupying an owned-but-not-
insured automobile at the time of the accident; the second part excludes
coverage if the insured settles, without his insurers' consent, with any-
one who may be legally liable for his injuries; and the third part pro-
vides that any payments under the endorsement are not to inure to the
benefit of any workmen's compensation or disability benefits carrier.
The separate portions of the exclusions section will be discussed in this
order.
1 Schallert, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Bane or Blessing? 1968 INs. L.J.
917, 918.
2 Throughout this paper reference will be made to the 1963 Countrywide Un-
insured Motorist Endorsement as the "standard endorsement." However, for
comparison, reference will also be made to the endorsement as found in the
Northwestern National Insurance Group's "Family Combination Automobile
Policy" and in the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's
"Automobile Policy." The exclusions will be discussed in the order in which
they are found in the exclusions section of the Northwestern Nat'l Policy.
The exclusions as found in all three endorsements are set out in the Appendix
to this paper.
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THE FIRST EXCLUSION:
"OCCUPYING AN OWNED-BUT-NOT-INSURED AUTOrMOBILE"
The standard wording that has been developed for the "occupying
an owned-but-not-insured automobile" exclusion is:
This endorsement does not apply:
(b) to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile
(other than an insured automobile) owned by a named in-
sured or any relative resident in the same household, or
through being struck by such an automobile, but this exclu-
sion does not apply to the principal named insured or his
relatives while occupying or if struck by an automobile
while owned by an insured named in the schedule or his
relativesY
In other policies4 the exclusion states that the policy does not apply "to
bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile (other than
an insured automobile) owned by the named insured or a relative, or
through being struck by such an automobile." This variation does not
contain the last clause of the exclusion as it appears in the standard
endorsement. The variation has been described as an earlier version
of the standard endorsement "in which the exclusion was worded so
as to apply to all relatives who owned a private passenger automobile."
The exclusion as found in the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Company's policy' uses the term "land motor vehicle" instead of
"automobile"; "land motor vehicle" apparently represents a newer vari-
ation of the language of the standard endorsement, drafted in response
to the difficulty that the word "automobile" has caused.7
The Purpose of the Exclusion
The "occupying an owned-but-not-insured automobile" exclusion
ostensibly represents an attempt to refine the definition of who is an
"insured" under the uninsured motorist endorsement. The exclusion
applies to those described in clause (a)(1) of the definitions section of
the standard endorsement:
3This exclusion does not appear in the 1956 Countrywide Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement.
4 E.g., Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Exclusion (a).
5 A. WIDIss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage § 2.9, at 28 n.25 (1969)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as WInlss].
6 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Exclusion (b).
7 See discussion, page 11, infra. The State Farm language was introduced in
late 1966: "[It] is to be noted that a policy issued by a major insurance
company in November, 1966, uses the terminology 'land motor vehicle' ....
State Farm Mutual Automobile Policy 9536.6 (Illinois), issued for the policy
period commencing November 4, 1966." Notman, A Decnnial Study of Unin-
sured Motorist Endorsements, 43 NoTRE DAME LAW. 5, 14 n.58 "(1967), re-
printed in 1968 INs. L.J. 22, n.58.
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(a) "insured" means:
(1) the named insured as stated in the policy ... and any
person designated as named insured in the schedule
and, while residents of the same household, the spouse
of any such named insured and relatives of either.8
The exclusion, however, "is primarily designed to induce [such in-
sureds] to acquire liability insurance for every automobile owned by
the purchaser of the insurance or by family members who reside with
the purchaser."9 This is largely so because the insurer wishes to limit
somewhat the risk to which it is exposed unless it can be assured of a
concomitant premium return.
The court in Smitke v. Travelers Indemnity Co.10 stated that the
exclusion is a "legitimate business purpose of an insurance company.""
The exclusion in Smitke was contained in a definition of "relative"
applicable to the definition of "persons insured" in the uninsured motor-
ist endorsement. 1 2 When the plaintiff, who himself owned an automobile,
was injured through the negligence of an uninsured motorist in whose
car he was riding, he sought coverage under the uninsured motorist
endorsement of his father's policy with Travelers. Although the plain-
tiff was a relative residing in his father's household, Travelers denied
coverage because of the exclusion, and, against the plaintiff's allegations
that the policy provisions were "ambiguous . . . unreasonable and capri-
cious in effect,"' 13 the court held for the insurer, stating that the defi-
nition of "relative" was perfectly clear. The court said that "Although
we could agree ... that ownership of an automobile by a relative may
diminish rather than increase the risks covered, decreasing the risk
does not appear to be the purpose of the exclusion.' 1 4 "[The] purpose
of the exclusion is to require any resident relative who owns an auto-
mobile to obtain this coverage as a part of a policy of his own."'
15
Contrary to what the court in Smitke surmised, it may be argued that
the insurer does wish to decrease the risks covered -through the use of
the exclusion, and that there is no real distinction between this desire
and the apparent inducement to relatives who own automobiles to obtain
their own coverage. Yet Smitke gives effect to what insurers apparent-
ly have intended by the exclusion's use, and the case is a good starting
s Cf. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Definitions, "insured," (a) ; State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Definitions, Insured (1).
9 WIDIss § 2.9, at 28.
10 264 Minn. 212, 118 N.W.2d 217 (1962).
"1 118 N.W.2d at 219.
32" '"[Relative]" means a relative of the named insured who is a resident of
the same household, provided neither he nor his spouse owns a private passen-
ger automobile.'" 118 N.W.2d at 218.
is 118 N.W.2d at 218.
14 Id. at 219.
15 Id.
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point from which to begin an examination of the validity and enforce-
ability of the exclusion. 6
The Validity and Enforceability of the Exclusion
Validity and Enforceability Upheld
Srnitke v. Travelers Indemnity Co. is a cogent statement in support
of the "occupying an owned-but-not-insured automobile" exclusion.
Several other courts have also found the exclusion valid and enforce-
able. In Spencer v. Traders & General Insurance Co.,17 the plaintiff
was riding in an automobile owned and driven by an uninsured motorist
when it collided with another automobile owned and driven by an unin-
sured motorist. The plaintiff sought coverage under the uninsured
motorist endorsement of a policy issued to the sister of the driver with
whom she had been riding. The sister's insurer denied coverage, alleg-
ing that, because the plaintiff had been occupying an automobile owned
but not insured by a relative of the sister, the exclusion should be given
effect. The Louisiana Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was ex-
cluded from coverage and rejected the plaintiff's argument that, not-
withstanding the exclusion, the automobile in which she had been riding
was an "insured automobile" because it was a "temporary substitute."
The court said that whether the automobile was a "temporary substi-
tute" or not was immaterial. Noting that the language of the insurance
contract was "clear and unambiguous" and that there was no apparent
conflict with any public policy, the court went on to say that:
The purpose of the exclusion obviously is to protect the insurer
against situations where an insured could pay for one policy
providing uninsured motorist coverage on one vehicle, and then
claim coverage while occupying any and all other vehicles owned
by residents of the same household, on the assertion that any one
of these other vehicles was being used as a temporary substitute
for the owned automobile. Even when such an assertion is false,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the insurer to disprove
it.
:18
16 For a criticism of the apparent purpose of the exclusion, see generally, 'WIDiSS
§ 2.9, at 28-29. Four reasons are given why the exclusion is difficult to justify:
(1) to allow the insurer to withhold coverage from an insured for lack
of the small additional premium necessary for coverage of a second vehicle
seems of "dubious merit";
(2) Because uninsured motorist coverage is theoretically posited on the
negligence of the unrelated uninsured motorist, there is little reason for any
limitation other than that of fault;
(3) The assumption is "unwarranted" that relatives would buy insurance
from the same company;
(4) The exclusion conflicts with a public policy favoring indemnification,
unless the victims themselves are at fault. Id. § 2.9, at 29.
17 171 So. 2d 723 (La. App. [3d Cir.] 1965). See also the companion case of
Rhodes v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 171 So. 2d 727 (La. App. 1965).
18 171 So. 2d at 726.
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Three years after Spencer was decided, another Louisiana Court
of Appeals was faced with the same exclusion. In Rushing v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,1" the plaintiffs were injured in an accident with an unin-
sured motorist while riding in a Ford truck owned and operated by
Rushing, who was also a plaintiff. Rushing also owned a Chevrolet
insured by Allstate with uninsured motorist protection, but the Ford
was uninsured. The plaintiffs claimed coverage under Allstate's policy
on the Chevrolet, but Allstate invoked the "occupying an owned-but-not-
insured automobile" exclusion. While the plaintiffs argued that the ex-
clusion contravened the Louisiana statute ° requiring uninsured motor-
ist coverage, the court held that it saw "[Nothing] in the statute which
requires an insurer to extend uninsured motorist protection under one
policy to one who has elected not to insure another vehicle owned by
him . .. . 21
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Webb,22 the language
of the exclusion was different from that in Spencer and Rushing and
was phrased in exactly the same terms as the standard endorsement.
It thus contained an "exception" to the exclusion by providing for a
schedule in which an insured could be listed-presumably for an addi-
tional premium. The exclusion then would not apply if the "principal
named insured" or a relative was injured while occupying, or was
struck by, an automobile owned by the insured named in the schedule.
Webb owned two automobiles, but only one of them was insured
with the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. When he was involved
in an accident with an uninsured motorist while driving his own unin-
sured automobile, the insurer was able to invoke the exclusion because
the schedule had been left blank. Webb thus did not fall within the
exception to the exclusion. The court held that the purpose of the ex-
ception was "[To] provide additional uninsured automobile coverage to
Webb and his relatives . . . . Had Webb desired to do so, he could
have secured this additional coverage for himself and his relatives on
his own uninsured vehicle .... "-'
Validity and Enforceability Denied
Less than two years after its decision in Webb v. United States Fi-
delity & Guaranty Co., the Florida First District Court of Appeals
again had before it a case in which the first exclusion was at issue.
In that case, Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Powell,2 4 the court held
that the exclusion was void, but it was able to do so largely because
the exclusion did not contain the "exception" found in Webb and in
19 216 So. 2d 875 (La. App. [1st Cir.] 1968).
2 0 LA. REv. STAT. tit. 22 § 1406(D) (1967).
21216 So. 2d at 876.
22 191 So. 2d 869 (Fla. App. [1st Dist.] 1966).
23 Id. at 870.
24 206 So. 2d 244 (Fla. App. [1st Dist.] 1968).
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the standard endorsement. 5 Mr. and Mrs. Powell each owned an
automobile, insured by separate insurers, and each of their automobile
insurance policies provided uninsured motorist coverage. They were in-
jured in a collision with an uninsured motorist while riding in Mr. Pow-
ell's car. Mr. Powell's insurer paid him the limits of his uninsured
motorist coverage, but when the Powells also made claim for additional
amounts under Mrs. Powell's endorsement with Travelers, the insurer
attempted to invoke the exclusion and deny coverage, arguing that Mr.
Powell's automobile was an "other than an insured automobile."
The court rejected Travelers' argument, agreeing with the Powells
that, "[It] is not the intent of the statute28 to limit coverage to an
insured by specifying his location or the particular vehicle he is occupy-
ing at the time of injury.12 7
The court went on to say, "[There] in no difference in [this']
exclusion clause . . . and 'set-off' provisions or 'other insurance' pro-
visions [declared invalid in Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co., 185 So 2d 689 (Fla 1966)]. Both are more restrictive than
the terms of the statute. If one is void, so is the other. '2
But Travelers had argued that the Webb decision was controlling
and the court was forced to reconsider what it has said in that case.
Noting that the Webb "exception" was not present in Mrs. Powell's
policy, the court called its language in Webb "unfortunate" in light of
the facts in Powell, but said:
However, we adhere to the Webb decision, it being our view, at
that time and today, that it was not the intent of Section 627.0851,
Florida Statutes, to allow a member of a family to purchase one
liability policy and claim total coverage thereunder for the entire
family while vastly increasing the risk to his insurer .... There-
fore, the Webb decision is not controlling under the facts of
the case sub judice.2 9
It is difficult to see how the risk to the insurer is less under the
facts in Powell than under those in Webb. The cases are factually
distinguishable, but if the court's concern in Powell is with coverage
more restrictive than that allowed by statute, such a possibility is no
less remote under Webb when an insured occupies an uninsured auto-
mobile owned by him. Furthermore, it has been pointed out3" that the
Powells were better off to have collided with an uninsured motorist,
where they were able to recover under both their policies, than with a
22 Cf. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Exclusion (a), which does not con-
tain the Webb and the standard endorsement "exception".
26 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0851 (1968).
27206 So. 2d at 246.
2sId. at 247.
29 Id.
30 5 N. Risjord & J. Austin, Automobile Liability Insurance Cases 5866-67 (1969).
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motorist insured for only the statutory limits. If the statutory limits
on bodily injury are the same as the limits under the uninsured motor-
ist endorsement, the Powells theoretically could have collected twice as
much by colliding with an uninsured motorist. In addition, in Florida
it would seem that the insured who owns two or more automobiles can
get higher uninsured motorist coverage limits by insuring each automo-
bile with a different insurer.31
Much the same result was reached in the California case of Lopez v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 32 as was reached in Powell. In Lopez,
a widow and her children sought a declaration that they were entitled
to recover, under the uninsured motorist endorsement of a policy issued
to one of the children, for the wrongful death of their husband and father
who had been killed by an automobile driven by an uninsured motor-
ist. The court affirmed a lower court finding that the decedent was an
insured under his daughter's policy, in spite of the fact that he also
owned an uninsured automobile. The exclusion was denied effect be-
cause, as expressed in California's Insurance Code,33 the state's policy
requires uninsured motorist coverage. While such coverage could be
omitted from a policy upon written agreement of the insured and the
insurer, "[The] mere acceptance of a liability policy with terms more
restrictive than the statute is not to be deemed a waiver of the statutory
coverage."'34 The rationale of Smitke v. Travelers Indemnity Co. was
rejected because "No Minnesota statute required uninsured motorist
coverage.' ' 3
A later California case was couched in much the same terms as
Lopez. Valdez v. Federal Mutual Insurance Co.,36 while involving a
"named driver exclusion," held than an express, not implied, waiver of
uninsured motorist coverage is required. The court was careful to point
out that while the California statute, as amended in 1961, allowed dele-
tion of uninsured motorist coverage by the insured, any waiver must
31Id. at 5867.
32250 Cal. App. 2d, 58 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1967).
33 CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (1969).
34 58 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
s5 Id. at 245.
36 77 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. App. 1969). As noted in the text, Valdez involved a
"named driver" exclusion in which the policy stated that, "[Such] insurance
as is afforded by this policy does not apply with respect to any claim arising
from accidents which occur while any automobile is being operated by: [the
named driver]." Id. at 412. The court partly relied on Hendricks v. Meritplan
Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 133, Cal. Rptr. 682 (1962), which concerned a
"25-year-old" exclusion. See also Southeast Title & Ins. Co. of America v.
Devine, 211 So. 2d 587 (Fla. App. 1968) ("25-year-old" exclusion applicable
to persons not members of insured's family held contrary to public policy
and void); Butts v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d 73 (Fla.
App. 1968), (exclusion purporting to relieve insurer of liability to insured's
minor son held invalid as more restrictive than the terms of Florida's unin-
sured motorist statute; the court relied heavily on Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Powell, 206 So. 2d 244 (Fla. App. 1966) ).
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specifically refer to such coverage. Furthermore, partial exclusions
"present a serious conflict between the insurance required by the statute
and the insurance offered by the insurer [and] invites [sic] an inter-
pretation that the endorsement was not intended to exclude the named
relative for the uninsured motorist coverage." 37 While "named driver"
and "25-year-old" exclusions form part of what have been called "en-
dorsements with less comprehensive coverage," 3s and are not exclusions
that properly fall within the exclusions section of the automobile liability
policy, Valdez indicates the aversion some courts feel toward any re-
strictions on coverage, especially when statutory mandates are present.
The language of the exclusion was not set out in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Meeks,39 but when Meeks collided with an uninsured motorist
while driving. his own uninsured Chevrolet, he sought coverage under
the uninsured motorist endorsement of his policy on his Ford. Allstate
resisted his 'claim, contending that the policy issued to Meeks on the
Ford did not extend to him while he was operating the "other" automo-
bile. The court allowed recovery, looking to the language of Virginia's
uninsured motorist statute,40 and stated that the statute did not restrict
the insured's coverage to the vehicle named in the policy. "On the con-
trary, the coverage extends to him while he is 'in a motor vehicle,' that
is, in any motor vehicle, 'or otherwise.' ",43
National Service Fire Insurance Co. v. MikeI4 2 represents a some-
what novel attempt by an insurer to use the exclusion. An automobile
owned by the decedent was not designated as an insured vehicle in an
automobile liability policy issued to the plaintiff (decedent's wife) by
the defendant-insurer. An uninsured motorist crashed into some gaso-
line pumps near which the decedent was standing while waiting for
gas for his car; the resulting explosion caused a fire which killed the
decedent, and his wife attempted to recover under the uninsured motor-
ist provision of her policy. While the terms of the exclusion were not
specified, the insurer argued that the accident arose from the ownership,
maintenance, or use of a non-designated vehicle. The court held for
the plaintiff, stating that it was "unpersuaded" that the "accident . . .
arose from the operation of a non-designated automobile owned by a
member of [plaintiff's] household .... -43
3T 77 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
38 WIDISS § 2.13 at 34. See cases cited in note 36 supra.
39 207 a. 897, 153 S.E2d 222 (1967).
40 VA. CoDE ANN. § 38.1-381(c) (1968).
41153 S.E.2d at 223.
42 204 So. 2d 343 (Fla. App. 1967).
43 Id. at 344. The insurer thus looked to the equivalent of the "occupying" portion
of the exclusion. A discussion of the various interpretations placed upon
"occupying" is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally WIDIss § 2.11, at
30. For a discussion of "occupying" under the medical payments provision of
the automobile policy, see Pouros, Melendes & Craig, Medical Payments Pro-
vision of the Automobile Insurance Policy: An Illustration of First Party
Insurance Problents, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 445, 468 (1969).
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Motorcycles
Cases involving motorcycles and the "occupying an owned-but-not-
insured automobile" exclusion are relatively numerous when the total
number of cases construing the exclusion is considered. The exclusion
states that bodily injury coverage to a named insured while occupying
an automobile (other than an insured automobile) owned by the named
insured or a relative is excluded. 44 Thus, if the named insured is riding
on an owned-but-not-insured motorcycle at the time of his accident with
an uninsured motorist, and if the insurer can establish that the motor-
cycle is an "automobile," coverage is precluded. 45
In Westerhausen v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,46 the decedent was
killed when he collided with an uninsured motorist while operating his
own uninsured motorcycle. His widow made a claim under the unin-
sured motorist endorsement of an automobile insurance policy issued
to her husband on their family car. The insurer attempted to invoke
the exclusion by arguing that the decedent's motorcycle was an "auto-
mobile" within the meaning of the exclusion, but the court rejected this
argument and looked to the insurer's definition of "automobile" else-
where in the policy. The court noted that the insurer hade defined "auto-
mobile" for other purposes as a four-wheeled vehicle, and the widow
was allowed recovery under the uninsured motorist endorsement.
Westerhausen was followed by the court in Valdes v. Prudence
Mutual Casualty Co.,47 where an insured was allowed recovery under
the uninsured motorist endorsement of a policy covering two family
automobiles owned by him, although he was riding on his uninsured
motor scooter at the time that he was involved in an accident with an
uninsured motorist. Finding that the facts of the case and the language
of the exclusion were nearly identical to those in Westerhausen, the
court said, "[The] "automobile" as that term is used in the exclu-
sionary clause . . . does not include . . . [the motor scooter] ...and
4 WIDISS § 2.9, at 28 n.24, and § 2.30, at 59, notes that the exclusion is now
often phrased in terms other than "automobile," stating that "highway
vehicle" is now used often; the State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Ex-
clusion (b), says "land motor vehicle." See also note 7 supra. Thus, it may
be expected that the number of cases concerned with whether a motorcycle
is an "automobile" will decrease.
45 This comparison of motorcycles and automobiles for purposes of the first ex-
clusion should be distinguished from such a comparison for purposes of de-
fining an uninsured automobile (or uninsured "motor vehicle," or uninsured
"highway vehicle"). In the latter comparison, is an uninsured motorcycle an
uninsured automobile when it collides with the automobile of an insured, or
when it strikes him as he is crossing a street? 'While these questions are be-
yond the scope of this article, it is interesting to note the court's varying
response to this distinction when confronted with cases concerned with motor-
cycles and the first exclusion, and when confronted with cases concerned
with motorcycles and the definition of uninsured automobile.
46 258 Iowa 969, 140 N.W.2d 719 (1966).
47 207 So. 2d 312 (Fla. App. 1968).
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• .. the exclusionary clause does not ... relieve [the insurer] of its
liability under the policy of insurance." 4
But in Shipley v. American Standard Insurance Co.,4 9 under facts
similar to those in the Westerhausen and Valdes cases, the court gave
effect to the exclusion, stating that:
An uninsured motorist endorsement should be interpreted in
light of statutory requirements concerning coverage. The stat-
ute50 was designed to protect innocent victims of negligent and
financially irresponsible motorists . . . . An overriding public
policy of protecting an owner-operator who inexcusably has no
applicable bodily injury liability coverage is not presently dis-
cernable. 51
It is interesting to compare the above cases with one not involving
the exclusion, but instead construing "uninsured automobile," where it
is alleged that such "uninsured automobile" is a motorcycle. This was
the situation in Voris v. Pacific Indemnity Co. 2 An uninsured motorist
endorsement was attached to a policy insuring the plaintiff's automobile
25 days after California passed its uninsured motorist statute, but three
months before the statute's effective date. Although the endorsement
used the term "automobile," rather than the statutory "motor vehicle,"
the court had little trouble in determining that, since the insurer must
have intended to use the endorsement after the statute became effective,
it must have intended that "automobile" would apply to all motor vehi-
cles listed in the statute. Thus, the plaintiff was allowed recovery under
her endorsement after being struck by an uninsured motorcyclist. While
it is questionable whether the insurer really did intend that "automobile"
should cover motorcycles before the statute became effective, Voris
does indicate that a court may be more willing to find that a motorcycle
is an automobile for one purpose than for another.
48d at 315. Cf., however, Dorrell v. State Fire & Cas. Co., 221 So. 2d 5 (Fla.
App. 1969), which demonstrates, in part, the direction a court may go when
the exclusion is not involved. Because the policy did not specifically provide
that the term "automobile" did not mean a "motorcycle," the court in Dorrell
held a motorcycle was an automobile so as to allow a motorcycle passenger
to recover under the uninsured motorist endorsement of an insurance policy
of the motorcycle's owner.
4 183 Neb. 109, 158 N.W.2d 238 (1968).
5o NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-509.01 (1968).
51 158 N.W.2d at 240.
r2213 Cal. App. 2d 29, 28 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1963).
3 See also Early v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 303
N.Y.S.2d 709 (App. Div. 1969) ("uninsured automobiles" in policy includes
motor scooter) ; Askey v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Co., 30 App. Div.
2d 632, 290 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1969) ("uninsured automobile" in policy held to
include motorcycles because nothing in policy specifically excluded them);
Hartford Acc. & Idem. Co. v. Come, 100 N.H. 177, 123 A.2d 267 (1956) (non-
owner policy excluded any automobile owned by the insured; "automobile"
construed to mean "motor vehicle" (as per the statutory language) and thus
a motorcycle was excluded).
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In spite of this, the same California Court of Appeals did not even
reach the question of whether a motorcycle is an automobile when it
decided the recent case of Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hurst.5 4 The facts
in Hurst were similar to those in Westerhausen, Valdes and Shipley.
The insured alleged that the first exclusion precluded Hurst, who had
collided with an uninsured motorist while riding his own uninsured
motorcycle, from recovery under the uninsured motorist endorsement
of a policy on his wife's automobile. The court, however, simply held
that the exclusion restricted the uninsured motorist coverage required
by the the California statute:
Section 11580.2 "becomes in effect a part of every policy of
insurance to which it is applicable to the same effect as if it
was written out in full in the policy itself." . . . It follows that
any policy provision which would narrow the coverage mandated
by the statute will not be enforced.
In view of our determination that exclusion (a) of plaintiff's
insurance policy was in conflict with the statute as applied to...
Hurst, it becomes unnecessary for us to undertake any interpre-
tation of that clause. 55
Although ostensibly a case in which the court's only concern might
have been whether a motorcycle is an automobile, Hurst instead turned
to those cases (e.g., Allstate Insurance Co. v. MV4eeks 56) decided in states
whose statutory language was similar to California's and held the
exclusion invalid at the outset. A similar result is conceivable in any
state (like Virginia) in which the first exclusion is viewed as in conflict
with statutory uninsured motorist language.
THE SECOND EXCLUSION:
"No SETTLEMENT WITHOUT CONSENT"
The standard wording of the "no settlement without consent" ex-
clusion is:
This endorsement does not apply:
(a) to bodily injury to an insured with respect to which such
insured, his legal representative or any person entitled to
payment under this endorsement shall, without written con-
sent of the company, make any settlement with any person
or organization who may be legally liable therefore. 57
54 83 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Cal. App. 1969).
55 Id. at 157-58.
56 207 Va. 897, 153 S.E.2d 222 (1967).
5 See also Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. Policy, Exclusion (b) ; State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Exclusion (a). The wording of the exclusion in the
Northwestern National Policy is the same as in the standard endorsement;
the wording of the exclusion in the State Farm Policy differs only in its
addition of "or care or loss of services recoverable by such an insured" fol-
lowing the opening "to bodily injury to an insured."
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This language is comparatively new, for prior to 1963 this exclusion as
found in the standard endorsement also contained a prohibition of
"prosecut[ion] to judgment [of] any action against any person or
organization who may be legally liable therefor." This pre-1963 lan-
guage, taken alone, was generally called a "permission to sue" (or "no
suit") clause,58 and, in spite of the revision of the 1956 standard en-
dorsement seven years ago, it continues to have considerable vitality.
As part of the 1963 revision, the "prosecution to judgement' prohibi-
tion (i.e., the "permission to sue' 'clause) was removed from the ex-
clusions section, leaving only the prohibition of settlement without
consent exclusion. "[The prosecution to judgment prohibition] is now
treated in a different manner and appears earlier in the endorsement,
immedately following the basic agreement. Such prosecution is no
longer treated as an event that will defeat coverage. Rather it is now
provided that "no such judgment shall be conclusive of the issues of
liability or damages as between the insured and the company."'59
As presently constituted, this new provision can be called a "consent
to be bound '60 clause to distinguish it from the older wording in the
exclusions section of the "permission to sue" clause.61 While a consid-
erable number of cases have already construed the new "consent to be
bound" provision, 2 they will not be discussed here because they are
outside the rather arbitrary limits set by the provisions of the exclu-
sions section.
However, some discussion of the original "permission to sue" clause
is necessary for a better understanding of the present "no settlement
without consent" exclusion for three reasons: (1) as already noted,
the "permission to sue" (or "prosecution to judgment" prohibition)
language is still found in the exclusions sections of some policies, (2)
some cases begun before the 1963 revision of the standard endorse-
58 WIDISS § 7.4, at 257.
59 Notman, A Decennial Study of Uninsured Motorist Endorsements, 43 NOTRE
DAntE LAW. 5, 14 (1967), reprinted in 1968 INs. L.J. 22, 31.6 0 1n the 1963 standard endorsement the clause states:
I. Damages for Bodily In jury Caused by Uninsured Automobile:
No judgment against any person or organization alleged to be legally
responsible for the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as between the in-
sured and the company, of the issues of liability of such person or organ-
ization of the amount of damages to which the insured is legally entitled
unless judgment is entered pursuant to an action prosecuted by the in-
sured with the written consent of the company.
See also Northwestern Nat!l Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage J, second paragraph;
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage U, second paragraph.
61 See, e.g., MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 245 Ark. 83, 431 S.W.2d 252
(1968) ; Johnson v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 462 D.2d 664 (Okla. 1969);
Heisner v. Jones, 169 N.W.2d 606 (Neb. 1969) ; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pietrosh,
454 P.2d 106 (Nev. 1969).
62 For a discussion of the "consent to be bound" clause, see O'Flaherty, The
"Consent to be Bound" Clause of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, paper
prepared for the Spring, 1969, Casualty Insurance Seminar, Marquette Uni-
versity Law School.
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ment are still being litigated, and (3) many of the reasons for upholding
or denying the validity or enforceability of the "permission to sue"
clause have vitality when the newer, "no settlement without consent"
exclusion is considered. In addition, it must be noted that, while the
pre-1963 standard endorsement contained the "permission to sue" clause
in the exclusions section, there was at the same time a prohibition of
settlement-a prohibition now phrased in terms of the "no settlement
without consent" provision in the second exclusion.
The Pre-1963 "Permission to Sue" Clause
BACKGROUND
Two reasons are generally given for the use of a clause providing
for the exclusion of uninsured motorist coverage if an insured prose-
cutes to judgment any action against anyone who may be legally liable
to him for bodily injury: (1) to protect the insurer's subrogation rights
against the uninsured motorist (for which provision is made in the
"Trust Agreement" section of the endorsement) and (2) to assure that
no judgment or settlement will be obtained in a situation in which the
insurers' rights are inadequately protected6 3 that is, "[To] prevent
the insured from making a nominal settlement (or covenant) with a
joint tortfeasor and then claiming substantial damages from his own
carrier. '64 These reasons have often formed the basis of those decisions
holding the "permission to sue" clause enforceable. However, as orig-
inally envisioned, the "permission to sue" clause was also designed to
avoid or limit an insurer's conflict of interest. "The theory was that the
insurer could invoke this clause to preclude any action by the insured
against the uninsured motorist until after the insurance company's lia-
bility under the uninsured motorist endorsement was determined-and
thereby avoid the conflict of interest which arises when both sides have
claims pending at the same time.
''65
Validity and Enforceability Upheld
Lack of Ambiguity
Some cases simply have held that the language of the "permission to
sue" clause is "specific, clear and unambiguous," requiring "no con-
struction or interpretation by [the] court,"6 6 and that it conflicts with
no statutory, or public, policy. In Oren v. General Accident Fire &
Life Assurance Corp. 7 a husband and wife died from injuries suffered
in an accident with an uninsured motorist. The administratrix of their
estates brought suit without the consent of the decedents' insurer and
63 Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1275, 1278 (1969).
r4 Notman, A Decennial Study of Uninsured Motorist Endorsements, 43 NoTRE
DAME LAW 5, 14 (1967), reprinted in 1968 Ius. L.J. 22, 31.
65 WIDISS § 7.4, at 257-58.
66 Oren v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assnr. Corp., 175 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla.
App. [3d Dist.] 1965).
671d.
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recovered judgments against the uninsured motorist. She then demand-
ed that the insurer arbitrate under the uninsured motorist endorsement
of its policy. In a separate action the insurer invoked the "permission
to sue" clause and alleged that the administratrix had violated the
policy's terms. The court agreed with the insurer, holding that the
exclusion's language was "plain, unambiguous, and specific." 6s There
were no allegations that the insurer refused its written consent to the
suit or that any of its conduct would result in waiver or estoppel.
Oren was cited and followed in both Phoenix Insurance Co. v.
Bowen,69 in which the insured settled with an uninsured motorist for
"$1.00 and other valuable consideration," and in Aetna Insurance Co. v.
Jordan,70 in which the court held that the trial court had erred in find-
ing that the "permission to sue" clause was void as a matter of public
policy.
But in Bass v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,7 ' a case decided by
another Florida court, the issue presented was whether the "permission
to sue" clause could exclude coverage if, at the time of the insured's
suit, the insured did not know that the tortfeasor was in fact uninsured.
The court stated that, "Insofar as [Oren, Pheonix and Jordan] have
held exclusion clauses to be valid, we concur. But insofar as those
decisions have left unanswered the issue of the effect of an exclusion
clause where no prejudice has been shown to the insurer, and where
circumstances indicate no violation of good faith by the insured, we
must look further." 72 The court went on to say that while prejudice
to the insurer is usually presumed, as in "lack of notice" cases, 73 if in
"consent" cases like Bass the insured can carry the burden of showing
no prejudice to the insurer, coverage will not be denied.74
In Travelers Indenity Co. v. Kowalski,75 the insured prosecuted
his claim against an uninsured motorist to judgment without his in-
surer's consent, and then demanded arbitration. In a declaratory judg-
ment action, the insurer alleged that the breach of the "permission to
681d.
69 178 So. 2d 751 (Fla. App. [3d Dist.] 1965).
10 189 So. 2d 408 (Fla. App. [lst Dist.] 1966).
71 199 So. 2d 790 (Fla. App. [4th Dist.] 1967), cert. dismissed, 206 So. 2d 212
(Fla. 1968).
72 199 So. 2d at 792.
73 "[The] Florida position on lack of notice cases is that prejudice to the in-
surer is presumed, with the burden upon the one seeking to impose liability
to show that no prejudice did result." Id. at 793.74 See also McInnis v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 208 So. 2d 481 (Fla.
App. 1968). Insureds settled with the insurer of the employer of the employee
with whom they had collided, even though the employee was uninsured and
was driving the truck without his employer's consent; they then sought their
own insurer's consent to sue the employee. In a declaratory judgment action
by their insurer, held, the insureds had breached the "permission to sue" ex-
clusion. "Such a breach will be presumed to have prejudiced the insurer, and
in the absence of an allegation by [the insureds] that no prejudice has in fact
resulted, [they] may not recover." Id. at 482.75 233 Cal. App. 2d 607, 43 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1965).
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sue" clause precluded coverage for the insured. The court, admitting
that insurance contracts are to be liberally construed in favor of in-
sureds and noting California's statute requiring uninsured motorist
coverage (although the statute allowed a "permission to sue" clause with
the same language found in the then standard endorsement), said,
"[Language] used in an insurance contract must be given its plain and
ordinary meaning, and when it is unambiguous it must be given that
effect.' 78 Thus, like the Florida cases discussed above, the court in
Kowalski did not find it necessary to go beyond the language of the poli-
cy to give effect to the "permission to sue" clause.
In Portillo v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,77 the "permission to
sue" clause was again held to be enforceable. The plaintiffs-a widow
and her children-sued two tortfeasors, only one of whom was insured, 7
and obtained a judgment for the wrongful death of their husband and
father in the amount of $65,000. They then filed suit against the in-
sured motorist's carrier and settled with it for $23,000 without their
own insurer's consent (although they did have their insurer's consent
to exhaust their right against the two tortfeasors). The plaintiffs sub-
sequently sued their own insurance carrier under the uninsured motor-
ist endorsement for the $42,000 balance. The court found that "The
provisions of the policy are explicit," and "'[there] is no room for con-
struction .. .' ,"79 and held that the failure of the insureds to get the
insurer's written consent to the settlement was a failure to comply with
the contract's terms. The court rejected without comment the plaintiff's
argument that the exclusion was inapplicable because the settlement
was not made with one who "may be" liable, but with one whose liabili-
ty had already been fixed by judgment.8 0
Both Kowalski and Portillo were later distinguished in Calhoun v.
State Farm Mututal Automobile Insurance Co.,"" on the basis that
the insurer's denial of coverage in those cases was not made until after
the insured's breach of the insurance contract. The insurer's denial of
coverage in Calhoun took place five months before its insured's settle-
ment with an uninsured motorist and was held to preclude the insurers'
invocation of the exclusion. It must be noted, however, that the court
found that the insurer had rather arbitrarily and "erroneously and
wrongfully" denied its insured's claim.82
76 43 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
77 238 Cal. App. 2d 58, 47 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1965).
78 The "uninsured" motorist was a serviceman who had an "on base" liability
policy that covered his automobile only while it was on a military reserva-
tion.
7947 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
80 Id. at 451. See also Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 36 INs. COUNSEL
J. 397, 416 (1969).
81254 Cal. App. 2d 407, 62 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1967).
82 62 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
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Insurer's Conduct
Some cases, while agreeing with the general validity of the "per-
mission to sue" clause, have held that the insurer's conduct in a parti-
cular instance may bar it from reliance on the exclusion. As already
noted, this was the result in Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. Furthermore, an insured may be allowed to show that
the insurer was unreasonable or arbitrary in withholding its consent
to suit (or settlement), thus rendering the exclusion invalid and unen-
forceable.8 3
In Childs v. Allstate Insurance Co., 4 the insured, Childs, collided
with an uninsured motorist. Childs' insurer, Allstate, from whom he
had obtained a policy with an uninsured motorist endorsement, investi-
gated and decided that the accident was Childs' fault. Allstate then paid
the property damage claim of the motorist with whom Childs had col-
lided and refused to pay Childs' claim against it under the uninsured
motorist endorsement. Childs then prosecuted to judgment an action
against the uninsured motorist without Allstate's consent and brought
action against Allstate for the amount of the judgment. Because All-
state had "determined independently for itself without arbitral or other
apparent aid" that Childs was responsible for the accident, the court
refused to give the "permission to sue" clause effect, holding that the
insurer was "simply not in a position to invoke this provision of the
policy."8 5 But the court chose not to "consider [the] efficacy and validi-
ty [of the clause] under other circumstances,"8'6 preferring to confiine
itself to the facts of the case under consideration.
In Levy v. American Automobile Insurance Co.8 7 the insurer re-
fused to give its consent to a suit against an uninsured motorist after a
long series of negotiations with its insureds had produced no results.
Even though the insureds refused to demand arbitration, their later
judgment against the uninsured motorist was held not to bar recovery
against the insurer under the uninsured motorist endorsement. To give
effect to the exclusion, the court held, would result in effectively forcing
the insureds to arbitrate. "There was an implied promise on the part
83As to withholding consent to settlement, see generally Widiss, Perspectives on
Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 497, 505 (1967); see also
Portillo v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 238 Cal. App. 2d 58, 47 Cal. Rptr. 450, 453
(1965).
84237 S.C. 455, 117 S.E.2d 867 (1961).
85 117 S.E.2d at 871.
s6 Id. at 871. See also Shibley v. Travelers Indem. Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 696, 223
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1962), where the court held a question of fact was presented
whether an insurer had waived its ability to rely on the "permission to sue"
clause by defending its named insured "in the very trial to which the pro-
vision would seem to require written consent." 223 N.Y.S.2d at 842. The
action had been brought by a passenger in the insured's automobile who had
been injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist.
8731 Ill. App. 2d 157, 175 N.E.2d 607 (1961).
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of the Insurance Company that it would not unreasonably or arbitrarily
withhold its written consent."8
A similar result was reached in Andeen v. Country 111iutual Insur-
ance Co.,8 9 where eleven months of negotiation resulted in an unsatis-
factory offer by the insurer. The insureds then obtained a much higher
judgment against the uninsured motorist and later sought to collect
the amount of the judgment from their insurer, who had refused its
consent to the suit. The insurer alleged a breach of the "permission to
sue" clause, but the court relied on Levy and noted that even though
mandatory arbitration agreements are now valid under Illinois law,
still "[An insurance company] cannot . . . deliberately prevent the
performance of a condition precedent to liability and then take advan-
tage of such wrongful conduct to avoid responsibility under the con-
tract."90
Much of the impetus for the court's decision in Andeen was given
by the insurer's almost total lack of action with regard to its insured's
claim after the eleven months' negotiation had failed.
Defendant insurance company was kept fully advised throughout
the proceeding before us. It received written notice of the filing
of the complaint and also specific written notice of the time for
the hearing in the proceeding against the uninsured motorist. The
company had every opportunity to defend the suit if it desired to
do so or to demand arbitration if that is what desired. The com-
pany did nothing.9 '
The court did not say whether the insurer's consent to suit was sought
or whether, if it was, the insurer was arbitrary in its denial. Thus,
unless the insurer's low settlement offer was considered a waiver of
its right to rely on the exclusion, the court seems to be looking to the
insurers' conduct after the insured's breach of the "permission to sue"
clause as a basis for its decision. On this basis, Levy is distinguishable,
although the court in Andeen looked to Levy for support of its position
than an insurer may be precluded from using the "permission to sue"
clause. 2
In Bielski v. Wolverine Insurance Co.,93 the insurer allegedly re-
fused the insured's repeated requests to arbitrate, and the insured later
took a $10,000 default judgment against the uninsured motorist. The
88 Id. at 164, 175 N.E.2d at 611.
89 70 I1. App. 2d 357, 217 N.E.2d 814 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1036 (1967),
rehearing denied, 386 U.S. 939 (1967).
90 70 II. App. 2d at 363, 217 N.E.2d at 817.
91 Id. at 366, 217 N.E.2d at 818.
92 In fairness to the insured, however, it must be pointed out that the uninsured
motorist had been intoxicated at the time of the accident and that the statute
of limitations on dramshop actions in Illinois is one year. Thus, the insured had
less than one month in which to file his action after the insurer had made its
settlement offer.
93379 Mich. 280, 150 N.W.2d 788 (1967).
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insurer then attempted to invoke the "permission to sue" clause in an
action brought by its insured against it to recover on the judgment. The
court held that a question of fact was presented as to whether the in-
surer had waived its rights to arbitration, for it could waive such
rights "regardless of what plaintiff [-insured] did or failed to do."94
Although the insurer had demanded arbitration after the insured began
his suit against the uninsured motorist, "If [a] defendant's conduct
has already worked a waiver of its rights to arbitration, its subsequent
demand [cannot] revive them. ' 95 Furthermore, if it is shown that
the insurer has waived the arbitration provision in the uninsured motor-
ist endorsement, the insurer can no longer rely on the "permission to
sue" clause, in spite of the fact that the insured may have prosecuted
an action to judgment. The Bielski court stated that it felt that the two
provisions are corollaries, "the exclusion clause serving to lend greater
force to arbitration requirements," and, if the insurer waives arbitration,
"the purpose of the former disappears." 6 Such a statement is appro-
priate in a state which, like Michigan, upholds the enforceability of
arbitration provisions.7 If the "permission to sue" clause is enforceable
and the insurer has not waived its right to demand arbitration, the
insurer can withhold its consent to suit, at least until its obligations
have been determined by arbitration. But if it waives its right to de-
mand arbitration (i.e., if the arbitration clause is then not enforceable),
to still give validity to the "permission to sue" clause would mean that
the insured would be unable to proceed against the uninsured motorist
unless he was willing to forego any benefits under his own policy.
Riley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.9 3 was an-
other case which, like Bielski, involved both Michigan law and the
possible waiver of arbitration. In Riley, the fact that the insurer had
decided that an accident involving an uninsured motorist was due to
the fault of its own insured, such that it settled with the uninsured
motorist, was held not to be "a sufficient basis from which to infer a
waiver"99 of its right to seek arbitration. The insureds had brought an
action against the uninsured motorist without their insurer's consent
almost two years after the accident, giving their insurer only three days'
notice of the action. There was no evidence that they had requested
arbitration of the insurer. It was held that the "permission to sue"
clause was enforceable because the insureds' action against the unin-
sured motorist had resulted in a $156,000 judgment. The court said that:
9 150 N.W.2d at 791.
95 Id. at 791.
96 Id. at 791.
97See Riley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir. 1970).
98420 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir. 1970).
99 Id. at 1377.
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[We] find [nothing] illegal in the ... exclusionary provision of
the policy.
Without such a provision the insured could do exactly what
he did here, namely, file suit, obtain a default judgment against a
person whom the insurer had no right to defend, and claim the
judgment as binding on the insurance company on the ground of
res judicata. 100
In Naparstek v. Citizens Mutual Insurance Co.,1' 1 a passenger
obtained a judgment against an uninsured motorist and then attempted
to recover the judgment from his host's uninsured motorist carrier.
The plaintiff asserted that the insurer had waived, or was estopped
from, reliance on the "permission to sue" clause because of certain
"promises, representations, and guarantees," made by the insurer and
upon which the plaintiff had allegedly relied. The plaintiff's principal
allegation seems to have been that the insurer withheld the policy's
terms from him, including the exclusionary clause, until two months
after he obtained judgment against the uninsured motorist. The court
rejected the plaintiff's argument, finding that while the insurer did not
voluntarily offer to send the plaintiff a copy of the policy, still the
plaintiff had made no effort to learn the policy's terms before he took
judgment. "We cannot say that plaintiff has raised the fact issue wheth-
er he relied upon any silence or failure of defendant to inform the
plaintiff of the exclusionary clauses."'10 2 Bielski and Andeen were found
to be readily distinguishable.
SUBROGATION
As already noted, one reason for the inclusion of the "permission
to sue" clause was the protection of the insurer's right of subrogation
against the uninsured motorist. "Any settlement made or judgment
secured by the insured, without the consent of the insurer, limits [the
right of recovery from the uninsured motorist] and can possibly indi-
rectly increase the risk by limiting the recovery against the uninsured
motorist to a sum less than that paid out under the policy."'10 3
The "permission to sue" clause was held valid and enforceable in
Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Torrance'04 largely on that
10 0 Id. at 1375, 1376.10119 Mich. App. 53, 172 N.W.2d 205 (1969).
102 172 N.W.2d at 211.
103 Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Torrance, 110 Ga. App. 4, 137, S.E.2d 551
(1964), aff'd 220 Ga. 639, 140 S.E.2d 840 (1965). WIDiss § 7.7, at 261, states,
however, that the danger that the insurer's position would be jeopardized if
litigation between the insured and the uninsured motorist is held determina-
tive of whether the insured is legally entitled to recover or of the amount
of damages could be obviated by the kind of language found in the post-
1963 "consent to be found" clause.
104 110 Ga. App. 4, 137 S.E.2d 551 (1964), aff'd 220 Ga. 639, 140 S.E.2d 840
(1965).
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basis-that to hold otherwise would severely limit the insurer's rights
against the uninsured motorist20 5 The clause, however, was character-
ized by the court in Cotton States as not properly an exclusion but, in-
stead, "a forfeiture of rights by conduct of the insured after liability
might have attached under the terms of the policy."'01
In Kisling v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 0 7 the plaintiff-insured
was involved in an accident with both an insured and an uninsured
motorist. Her automobile insurance policy with MFA contained an un-
insured motorist endorsement. She settled with the insured motorist,
giving a covenant not to sue, but did so without the consent of her
insurer. She subsequently sued MFA under the uninsured motorist
coverage of her policy. The court called the second exclusion in the
exclusions section the "consent exclusion," noting that it was divided
into two parts: (1) what the court called the "judgment prohibition"
(i.e., the "permission to sue" clause) and (2) the "settlement prohibi-
tion." Kisling is a kind of bridge to those cases (to be discussed later),
which are only concerned with the post-1963 version of the second ex-
clusion where the only prohibition is one against settlement, the refer-
ence to prosecution to judgment having been moved to the "consent to
be bound" clause. Three years before Kisling, in State ex rel. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v,. Craig,°0 the same court
had held that the "judgment prohibition" portion of the exclusion was
void as against public policy. But the insured in Kisling had settled with
an insured motorist without her own insurer's consent, and so the
court was forced to construe not the "judgment prohibition," but the
"settlement prohibition." The court held that the "settlement prohibi-
tion" was enforceable:
From a public standpoint, it is particularly desirable and im-
portant in states such as Missouri, where uninsured motorist
coverage presently is made available on a permissive basis for a
105 But see Gulf American Fire & Cas. Co. v. McNeal, 115 Ga. App. 286, 154
S.E.2d 411 (1967), where the "permission to sue" clause was found to be
repugnant to the Georgia statute (GA. CoDE ANN. § 56-407.1 (a) (Supp. 1967))
requiring uninsured motorist protection. Cotton States was distinguished on
the basis that the cause of action in that case arose before the statute's
effective date. However, McNeal also calls the "permission to sue" clause
"a policy provision for forfeiture of the uninsured motorists coverage." 154
S.E.2d at 417.
106 137 S.E.2d at 553 (emphasis added). See also Kirouac v. Healey, 104 N.H.
157, 181 A.2d 634 (1962), where the court held that the "permission to sue"
clause simply forces the insured claimant to make a choice suing the unin-
sured motorist and seeking a recovery under the policy. This result was
reached in the face of the New Hampshire statute (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 268:8 (1957)) stipulating that nothing contained in the statute should be
construed so as to deprive an insured-claimant "in litigating his claim against
the uninsured motorist from a right of trial by jury." WIDIss § 7.7, at 261
n.12; Kelly, Kirouac v. Healey: Comments on the Uninsured Motorist En-
dorsement in New Hampshire, 7 N.H. BAR J. 92 (Jan. 1965).
107 399 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. App. 1966).
108 364 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. App. 1963).
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modest premium, that the risk assumed under such coverage, and
thus the cost thereof, should not be increased unreasonably and
unnecessarily. The settlement prohibition looks toward that end
... . No consideration of public policy has been advanced,
and we know of none, which . . . should or does preclude the
parties to an insurance policy from so contracting." 9
Thus, while upholding the invalidity of the "judgment prohibition" or
"permission to sue" clause of the second exclusion, first propounded in
Craig, the court in Kisling upheld the "settlement prohibition" portion
-and, in so doing, it looked to the protection of the insurer's interests
and, impliedly, to its rights of subrogation."0
Obviously the "permission to sue" and "settlement prohibition"
clauses would be valueless in the first instance unless the insurer has a
right of subrogation. The insurer's subrogation rights are provided for
in the "Trust Agreement" section of the standard endorsement which
provides, inter alia, that:
Trust Agreement: In the event of payment to any person
under this endorsement:
(a) the company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment
to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may
result from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such
person against any person or organization legally responsi-
ble for the bodily injury because of which such payment is
made;"'
The "Trust Agreement" section also provides that the insured will hold
in trust for the insurance company all rights of recovery which he has
against the tortfeasor. One commentator has stated that this latter
provision has at least two purposes: (1) it keeps the insurer out of any
case as a real party in interest, and (2) it avoids the rule prohibiting
assignment of a personal tort.' 12
Subrogation for uninsured motorist insurance has been felt to have
both distinct advantages and disadvantages. Of the advantages it has
been said:
It allows for lower premium rates if the potential subrogation
rights are taken into consideration, and it permits the tortfeasor,
who is primarily liable, to be held responsible whenever he is
not judgment proof. When coupled with the "no settlement with-
out consent" exclusion, the right of subrogation prevents the
insured from fixing the ultimate incidence of loss by accidental,
109 399 S.W.2d at 251.
110 But see Gattenby v. Allstate Ins. Co. - S.W.2d - (Mo. App. 1967),
where a "settlement prohibition" was held void as against public policy.
11" See also Northwestern Nat'l Policy, Trust Agreement (a) ; State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Trust Agreement (a). As to the "Trust Agreement"
generally, see WIDISS § 5.2-5.5, at 162-66.
11232 Mo. L. REv. 159, 161 (1967). The same author notes that whether this
second purpose is successful depends on whether a distinction should be
drawn between assignment and subrogation. Id. at 161.
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capricious or collusive means, or from getting double recoveries.
It does not give rise to the underlying reasons for holding assign-
ments of personal torts to be void as against public policy.
Further, since the trust agreement is a form of conventional or
contractual subrogation, to deny it effect could be an infringe-
ment of freedom of contract."31
On the other hand, disadvantages of subrogation may include the
possibility that if subrogation rights are not included in insurers' rate
structures, the insurers will garner a real "bonus" at the expense of
the insureds. Furthermore, the subrogation claim may complicate and
discourage settlements because of (1) the necessity of consent or, (2)
the possibility of multiple subrogation claims where the plaintiff is
covered by overlapping policies.
STRICT CONSTRUCTION: "JUDGMENT"
Some courts have attempted to ameliorate the effect of the "permis-
sion to sue" clause by imposing a strict construction on the term
"judgment." 1"14 In Terzian v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange,1 '
a judgment was obtained by an insured without the consent of his
insurer after the uninsured motorist had been discharged in bankruptcy.
Since the discharge had released the uninsured motorist from liability
for the insured's injuries in the insured's suit against him, the uninsured
motorist was not "legally liable therefor." Because the judgment had
been entered upon a stipulation, the insured was held not to have
"prosecuted his claim to judgment" within his policy's exclusion. And,
in Carter v. American Fire & Casualty Co.," 6 the insureds brought
action against an uninsured motorist without their insurer's consent
and received a summary judgment in their favor on the issue of liability.
They-then proceeded to a trial on the issue of damages and received
jury verdicts. But while the verdicts were recorded, judgments were
never entered on them. For this reason, the court held that the insureds
had not prosecuted their actions to judgment within the meaning of
the "permission to sue" clause. At the same time the court rejected the
insurer's argument that, because entry of judgment is only a ministerial
function, it is the equivalent of a "prosecution to judgment." The
results in both the Terzian and Carter cases seem consistent with the
general rule that insurance contracts are to be liberally interpreted in
favor of the insured and coverage. Indeed, the court in Carter said,
"The provisions of a policy of insurance which tend to limit or avoid
liability are to be construed most strictly against the insurer."'1 7
113 32 Mo. L. REv. 159, 162-63 (1967).
114 See cases cited in Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1275 (1969).
115 83 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Cal. App. 1969).
136 219 So. 2d 462 (Fla. App. 1969).
1 " Id. at 464.
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The Pre-1963 "Permission to Sue" Clause
Validity and Enforceability Denied
Courts that have refused to uphold the validity and enforceability
of the "permission to sue" clause generally have done so for one of three
reasons.
Restriction of Insured's Rights
A statute or public policy may prohibit any restriction on the rights
of an insured to a court determination of his contractual rights. State
ex rel. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Craig,"8 in
which the court held that the "judgment prohibition" section of the
second exclusion was void as against public policy, has already been
mentioned in a preceding section.1 19 In that case the court, after holding
that a mandatory arbitration provision was unenforceable and that the
"general rule is that the [insurance] contract cannot oust jurisdiction of
the courts as to a determination in respect to liability,"'120 went on to
add:
The ["consent"] exclusion as a bar to suit must fall along with
the arbitration clause. The exclusion would reasonably be appli-
cable in situations where arbitration is required; but, when this
is not the case, it would be against public policy to permit a pro-
hibition against resort to the courts for remedy without the con-
sent of the person ultimately liable.'
2 1
It was the earlier case of Boughton v. Farmers Insurance Ex-
change12 2 that apparently first stated the rule that any restrictions on
an insured's ability to enforce his contractual rights are to be disregard-
ed. (In this connection, it should be noted that in both Craig and
Boughton arbitration provisions were also held void and unenforceable;
this fact forms a second reason for holding "permission to sue" clauses
unenforceable and will be taken up in the next section.) In Boughton,
the court said that:
In as much as the insurer agreed to pay all sums insured shall
be legally entitled to recover from an uninsured motorist and the
''no action" provision would restrict insured from enforcing these
rights, we hold such provision to be void. 2 3
Arbitration Agreements are Unenforceable
Because a mandatory arbitration provision has been held unenforce-
able in some jurisdictions, it has been said that an insurer cannot seek
to discourage or penalize the insured from seeking recovery directly
against the uninsured motorist. In the jurisdictions where a mandatory
arbitration provision is enforceable, it has been stated that the insurer
118 364 S.W2d 343 (Mo. App. 1963).
119 Page 383 supra.
120 364 S.W.2d at 345.
12 Id. at 346.
122354 P.2d 1085 (Okla. 1960).
123 Id. at 1089. See also Dominici v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 143 Mont.
406, 390 P.2d 806 (1964).
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is in a good position to argue that the "permission to sue" clause should
also be deemed enforceable "because the combination of the two clauses
allows the company to avoid the conflict of interest problem." '124 The
dilemma that an insured may face in a jurisdiction which denies en-
forceability to mandatory arbitration provisions is illustrated by a
statement from Dorninici v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. :125
Without arbitration [in states where arbitration agreements are
unenforceable] plaintiffs are left without a remedy to establish
the applicability of the uninsured motorist clause and the amount
of damages. [The insurer] cannot be allowed to take the premi-
um with one hand while refusing recovery with the other.1 26
Such a consideration also influenced the decisions in the Craig and
Boughton cases already discussed. Dominici, like Craig and Boughton,
was decided in a jurisdiction (Montana) where contracts to arbitrate
future disputes are unenforceable. Holding that "[The] question of
this type of arbitration is inexorably tied to the ["permission to sue"]
clause [and that they] complement one another to the point one cannot
exist without the other," the Dominici court said that the "permission to
sue" clause "necessarily becomes unreasonable and must fall."' 27
Insurer Can Participate In Action
A third reason that can be given for refusing to uphold the validity
and enforceability of the "permission to sue" clause is that the insurer
can intervene as a third party defendant and participate in litigating
both liability and damages,'28 or can enter the case through the plain-
tiff-insured's use of joinder.129 The court in State ex rel. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Craigb' 0 in speaking of the pro-
vision in the "Conditions" section of the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment, in which the insured is usually required to furnish his insurer
with a copy of the summons and complaint in any action he brings
against the uninsured motorist, said that:
Of what value and to what purpose is this provision if the insurer
is required to sit idly without power or right to intervene to
protect its interest in event of default? . . . We think such pro-
vision is indicative of the intention that the "accident" insurer
should have some right to take some action in a case which de-
termines whether there are facts which make it effectively
"bound."'2
124 Widiss § 7.6, at 260.
125 143 Mont. 406, 390 P.2d 806 (1964).
126 390 P.2d at 810.
127 Id. at 809.
s2 8 See MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lovins, 248 F.Supp. 108 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
129 Dominici v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 143 Mont. 406, 390 P.2d 806
(1964).
130 364 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. App. 1963).13'Id. at 349.
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The Post-1963 "No Settlement Without Consent" Provision
Background
It will be remembered that in 1963 the "permission to sue" clause
was removed from the exclusions section of the uninsured motorist
endorsement. 132 What was left in the second exclusion was a provision
prohibiting settlement without the insurer's written consent with any
person or organization who may be legally liable for the insured's
bodily injuries. At the same time, the "consent to be bound" language
was added immediately following the statement of the basic insuring
agreement. "Prosecution, therefore, [does] not act to bar the UM
claim, but settlement with any such third party, without the written
consent of the insurer, [remains] an exclusion."' 3 3 The number of
decided cases construing the new "consent to be bound" clause are be-
yond the scope of this paper.3 4
Some of the older cases that were decided when the second exclu-
sion contained both "permission to sue" and "no settlement without
consent" language did, in fact, involve settlement, e.g. Kisling v. M1IFA
Mutual Insurance Co.' 35 The cases that follow involve the post-1963
wording. The cases considering policies whose exclusionary language
is phrased in terms of "no settlement without consent" contain much
of the same reasoning for granting or denying enforceability at the
"permission to sue" cases.
In Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Van Buskirk,"6 the
court said that the purpose of the "no settlement without consent" ex-
clusion is "to protect the company from the payment of claims which
have not been determined by a court."' 37 It held that the agreement
to reduce the amount of an ad damnum in an action against an unin-
sured motorist was not a settlement, agreeing, however, that any settle-
ment would preclude the insureds' recovery. And, Labove v. American
Employers Insurance Co., 3s in upholding the exclusion, held the rea-
132 "[No] statement explaining this modification has been made generally avail-
able." WIDIss § 7.8, at 262.
133 Pretzel, Coverage Against Uninsured Motorists-Recent Developments, 18
DEFENSE L.J. 119 (1969).
"3 See O'Flaherty, note 62 supra.
135 399 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. App. 1966). They were included with their "permission
to sue" counterparts soley from the standpoint of organization; those cases
in the "permission to sue" section were so placed because the language of
the exclusion was that of the pre-1963 variety.
136 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467 (1967).
"3 215 A.2d at 473.
138 189 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 1966). While the language of the exclusion in the
policy involved, as quoted by the court, says nothing of "prosecution to
judgment," nor is the date of the accident giving rise to the action specified,
both the date of the case and the court's statement that Portillo v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 47 Cal. Rptr. 450 (Cal. App. 1965), and Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
Bowen, 178 So. 2d 751 (Fla. App. 1965), construed "the exclusionary clause
in question" indicates that the exclusion in LaBove may have been of the
pre-1963 kind.
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sons for enforcing the "no settlement without consent" exclusion in-
clude: (1) the prevention of settlement with those who "may be" liable
before the insurer has had notice of the proposed settlement, (2) the
possible desire of the insurer to enter into the negotiations between
its insured and the uninsured motorist, and, (3) the possibility that
the insurer's subrogation right would be lost by any settlement.139
Validity and Enforceability Upheld or Denied
Like the cases which have upheld the general validity of the "per-
mission to sue" exclusion while also holding that the insurer's conduct
may prevent assertion of its insured's breach of the clause, Volkswagen
Insurance Co. v. Taylor"4 0 held that by participating in arbitration pro-
ceedings after it knew of its insured's settlement and release, an insurer
could not later insist that the "no settlement without consent" exclusion
relieved it of liability. The plaintiff had been a passenger in an auto-
mobile that first collided with an automobile driven by an uninsured
motorist and then was struck by an insured motorist with whom the
plaintiff later settled. Because the trial court had credited against the
arbitration award for the plaintiff the amount the plaintiff had received
in his settlement with the insured motorist, the court said that it was
hard to see how the settlement had prejudiced the insurer's rights of
subrogation.
In Mid-Central Mutual Casualty Co. v. Spanier,14' another case
in which an insurer attempted to use the "no settlement without con-
sent" exclusion to avoid liability, Mid-Central had issued a policy to
Spanjer, whose automobile had been loaned to some friends when
they were struck by a hit-and-run motorist. Mid-Central sought a dec-
laration that its policy wasn't in force at the time of the accident. While
this action was pending, the driver and passengers settled for $6,000
with another insurer under a policy covering the driver. Then Mid-
Central and the defendants-the driver and the passengers-entered
into an agreement to arbitrate all issues except the effect of the amount
already paid in settlement. The arbitrator made an award to the de-
fendants, whereupon Mid-Central alleged that it was not indebted in
any way to the defendants.
The court disagreed with Mid-Central, stating that Mid-Central
could not rely on the "no settlement without consent" exclusion:
Paragraph 2(a) of the arbitration agreement provides that
one of the issues to be determined by the arbitrators is "whether
all of the terms and conditions of the endorsement.. . have been
complied with by claimants (defendants) . .
139Id. at 318.
140 201 So. 2d 624 (Fla. App. 1967).
141 101 Ill. App. 2d 468, 243 N.E.2d 452 (1968).
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The language of the agreement reserving for determination
by the court the "effect of previous payments . . ." does not
reserve the issue of consent. In the absence of a specific waiver
in the arbitration agreement of the effect of the denial of liabili-
ty, we hold that plaintiff cannot now rely on the exclusion.142
It will be remembered that in the discussion of the "permission to
sue," Kisling v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co.143 was cited as holding
that the "settlement prohibition" portion of the second exclusion was
enforceable. But Kisling was not the last word on the subject in Mis-
souri. Just a little over a year later, under facts similar to those in
Kisling, another Missouri court, in Gattenby v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,"' held that the "settlement prohibition" was void as against public
policy. While arising under the pre-1963 language of the standard
endorsement, Gattenby distinguished Kisling on the somewhat tenuous
basis that Kisling only had to consider a rather specific attack on the
clause and was able to hold it enforceable under the narrow facts pre-
sented in that case. But the Gattenby court felt that the objections to
the "settlement prohibition" made in it were "much broader" and, in
holding the exclusion void, based its decision on the proposition that
compromises and settlements are favored by the law and that without
them court calendars would become hopelessly clogged.
In finding the "no settlement without consent" exclusion void, the
court in Guthrie v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,145 applying Vir-
ginia law, said that the insurer and insured in an uninsured motorist
setting are essentially adversaries, thus largely obviating any need for
cooperation, and also said that the statutory prohibition 46 of any
restriction on an insured's right of recovery contained only the excep-
tion that the insurer receive service of process when suit is brought
against an uninsured motorist. /
Finally, while upholding the validity and enforceability of the ex-
clusion in the normal situation, the court in Michigan Mutual Liability
Co. v. Karsten'4" held that the exclusion did not apply under the facts
of that case. The insured settled with the insured tortfeasor, but did
not settle with the uninsured tortfeasor; the court "limited" the applica-
tion of the exclusion by saying, "[The] exclusion clause does not pro-
hibit a settlement with a joint tortfeasor liable for injuries arising out
of the ownership, maintenance or use of his own insured vehicles."' 4
42Id. at 474, 243 N.E.2d at 455.
143 399 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. App. [Springfield] 1966).
144 _ S.W.2d - (Mo. App. 1967).
'45 279 F.Supp. 837 (S.C. 1968).
146 VA. CODE ANN. § 38-1-381 (g) (Supp. 1968).
14713 Mich. App. 46, 163 N.W.2d 670 (1968).
148 163 N.W.2d at 672.
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In reviewing the relatively small number of cases construing the
newer "no settlement without consent" exclusion, it can be seen that the
courts in many instances have looked for guidance to the older cases
that arose under the pre-1963 endorsement. The fact that the number
of cases since 1963 is small may indicate that insurers are careful to
assert the possibility of exclusion before the insured settles, or the
possibility of settlenments with uninsured motorists simply may be few
in number when the likelihood is considered that many uninsured mo-
torists would have little to contribute to settlement in any event.
THE THIRD EXCLUSION:
WORKMEN'S COMPFNSATION
The standard wording that has been developed for the "workmen's
compensation or disability benefits" exclusion is:
This endorsement does not apply:
(c) so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any
workmen's compensation or disability benefits carrier or
any person or organization qualifying as a self-insurer under
any workmen's compensation or disability benefits law or
any similar law.149
It has been seen that a principal reason for the insurers' inclusion
of both the old "permission to sue" clause and the later "no settlement
without consent" exclusion in their policies was a desire to protect their
rights of subrogation against the uninsured motorist-tortfeasor. The
"workmen's compensation" exclusion attempts to prevent subrogation
by a workmen's compensation or disability benefits carrier to an in-
sured's right against the uninsured motorist carrier. "The effect of
this exclusion is to bar a workmen's compensation carrier from taking
credit against its liability for payments made under the uninsured motor-
ist endorsement."1 50 Because this statement seems as applicable to the
"set-off" provision in the "Limits of Liability" section of the standard
endorsement, and seems somewhat in conflict with the statement that
precedes it, some distinction should be made between the third exclu-
sion and the "set-off" provision. The "set-off" provision in the "Limits
of Liability" section purports to reduce "amounts payable under [the
uninsured motorist] indorsement by the amount paid to the insured on
account of the same injury under any workmen's compensation
clause." 151 This "Limits of Liability" clause is a "set-off" or "reduction"
149 The exclusion is found in exactly the same form in both the Northwestern
Nat'l and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. policies: Northwestern Nat'l
Policy, Exclusion (c); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Exclusion(c). In addition, the same language was used in the 1956 standard endorse-
ment.
150 Fairgrave & Forney, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 31 INs. CouNsEL J. 665
(1964).
'51 See cases construing this clause in Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1369 (1969).
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provision and is intended to prevent double recovery by an injured
person eligible to receive workmen's compensation or other disability
benefits-a double recovery that would come at the expense of the un-
insured motorist insurance carrier. The third "exclusion," on the other
hand, is intended to prevent the accrual of benefits to the workmen's
compensation or disability benefits carrier-not to the injured person.
Relatively few cases have construed the "workmen's compensation"
exclusion. Perhaps the first was Home v. Superior Life Insurance
Co.,1" 2 where the court agreed with the exclusion's apparent premise
that the "provision . . . attempts to foreclose the possibility that a
workmen's compensation carrier will be allowed to secure subrogation
from the uninsured motorist carrier."'15 3
It is reasonable to conclude that is was not contemplated by the
[Virginia] General Assembly that the employer's right of subro-
gation under the Workmen's Compensation Act should extend
to the employee's rights under the uninsured motorist coverage
of a liability.'5 4
The court also held, however, that the employer's statutory right of
subrogation against the negligent third party-tortfeasor (i.e., the un-
insured motorist in these cases) is superior to that of the uninsured
motorist insurance carrier under the state's uninsured motorist statute.
Such a holding appears to be consistent with the general rule that while
those who pay workmen's compensation may not recover their losses
from the uninsured motorist carrier, no rights of the workmen's com-
pensation carrier are foreclosed as against the third party-tortfeasor,
and, in such a case, the workmen's compensation carrier generally has
a prior right as against the uninsured motorist carrier.155
But while Home upheld the exclusion, the two federal courts in
Arkansas have each refused to give effect to the provision. In Jones v.
Morrison156 the court found that the decision in Horne, which held
that recovery by the injured insured against the uninsured motorist
carrier was not a "recovery against any other party" (i.e., so as to
allow the workmen's compensation carrier subrogation rights against
an uninsured motorist insurance carrier), was in conflict with Arkan-
sa's workmen's compensation act. The court said that any recovery,
of whatever nature, is compensation for injuries, and the act provides
reimbursement for the workmen's compensation carrier whenever pos-
sible.
152 203 Va. 282, 123 S.E.2d 401 (1962).
153 WIDISS § 2.67, at 124.
154 123 S.E.2d at 404.
155 Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1369, 1373 (1969).
156 284 F.Supp. 1016 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
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The Jones court added that when there can be no reimbursement,
as when an employee is injured by his own acts or by those of his
employer, it is simply a risk of business that the workmen's compensa-
tion carrier has agreed to assume. But such is not the case when a
negligent third party is present. The act's purpose is not to provide a
double recovery by the employee from both the compensation carrier
and the third party-tortfeasors; thus, his recovery from any third party
"compensates" him and, having been paid, the compensation carrier
is entitled to reimbursement to the extent provided in the state's work-
men's compensation act.
Jones was further applied in Boehler v. Insurance Company of
North America,:5 7 where an insured who had received both workmen's
compensation and uninsured motorist benefits resisted the compensa-
tion carrier's attempt to seek enforcement of its statutory right of sub-
rogation. The court allowed the attempt, holding that an uninsured
motorist carrier "has no legitimate interest in keeping the proceeds of
uninsured motorist insurance out of the hands of a workmen's com-
pensation carrier."
It seems clear that the Workmen's Compensation Act expresses
a public policy favorable to subrogation, and the provision here
in question tends to militate against that policy.'
While it has been noted that "some interesting litigation is develop-
ing" i 9 with regard to the "workmen's compensation" exclusion, the
provision has been a part of the standard endorsement since uninsured
motorist coverage was first seriously promulgated in 1956, and the
relative scarcity of cases construing the provision indicates, perhaps,
that much more litigation is occurring over the "set-off" provision in
the "Limits of Liability" section of the endorsement."'"
FREDERICK T. OLSON
257 290 F.Supp. 867 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
158 Id. at 871.
159 WIDIss § 2.67, at 124.160 See also Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 285 F. Supp. 920 (Neb.
1968), where the court was presented with a question of whether a Nebraska
statute granting subrogation rights to a workmen's compensation carrier also
granted "a compensation carrier subrogation rights against uninsured motorist
coverage benefits." The court held that a compensation carrier is not entitled
to reimbursement from uninsured motorist coverage payments, but is only
entitled to subrogation against the uninsured motorist.
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APPENDIX
1963 COUNTRYWIDE UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT
in consideration f the payment of the premium for this endorsement a d subject to all of the terms of this endorsement, theconpany agrees
with the named insured as tollows:
INSUgNG AGREEMENTS
1. Damages for Bedily tjury Caused by Uninsured Automobile: The
company wilt pay all sums which the insured or his tegal representative
shalt be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or
operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness
er disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called
bodily injury." sustained by the msured, caused by accident and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use ot such uninsured
automobile. provided for the purposes of this endorsement, determna-
tion as to whether the insured or such representative is legally en,
tlied to recover such damages, and it su the amount thereof, shall
be made by agreement between the insured or such representative and
the company or, if they fait to agree, by arbitration.
go udgment against any person or organization alleged to be legally
responsible for the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as between the
insured and the company, of the issues of liability of such person or
organization or of the amount of damages to which the insured is
legally entitled unless such judgment is entered pursuant to an action
prosecuted by the insured with the written consent of the company.
II. Definitions:
(a3 "insured" means
It) the named insured as stated in the policy (herein also refeored
to as the "prncipat named snsured'I and any person designated
as named insured in the schedule and, while residents of the
same household, the spouse of any such named insured and
retaives of either:
(2) any other persun while occupying an insured automobile; and
(3) any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover
because of bodily injury to which this endorsement applies sus-
tained by an insured under (I or 12) above.
The insurance applies separately with respect to each insured, but the
applicalion of the insurance to more than one insured shell not
operate to increase the limits of the company's liability.
bi "insured automobile" means an automobile:
(t described in the schedule as an insured automobile to which
the bodily injury liability coierage ot the policy applies;
(21 while temporarily used as a substitute for an insured automubile
as described in subparagraph (l) above, when withdrawn from
normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or
destbction;
r3 while beng operated by a named insured or by his spoue i aresident ot the some household,
but the term "insured automobile" shalt not include:
1I an automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance;
Gh an automobile while being used withou the permission of the
owner;
hilt under subparagraphs (2) and (3) above an automobile owned by
the principal named insured or by any named insured designated
in the schedule or by any resident of the same household as
such insured; or
iv) under subparagraphs (2) and (3) above. an automobile furnished
for the regular use of the principal named insured or any
resident oi the same household.
to) "uninsured automobile" means
(ll an automobile with respect to the ownership, maintenance or
use of which there is in at least the amounts specifoed by the
financial responsibility law of the state in which the insured
automobile is principalliy garaged, n bodly injury liability bond
or insurance policy applicable at the time oI the accident with
respect to any person or organization legally responsible for the
use of such automobile, or-with respect to which there is a
bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the
time of the accident but the company writing the same denies
coverage thereunder- of
12) a hitand-run automobile as defined.
but the term "uninsured automobile" shall not include:
(i an insured automobile;
lid an automobile which is oxired or operated by a self-insurer
within the meaning of any motor vehicle financial responsibility
law, motor carrier law or any similar law;
(idi} an automobile which is owned by the United States of America.
Canada, a state, a political subdrwision of any such goveroment
or an agency of any of the foregoing:
ivl a land motor vehicle or trailer if operated on rails or crawler.
treads or white located for use as a residence or premises and
not as a vehicle; or
tot a fan type tractor or equipment designed for use principally off
public roads, except while actually upon public roads.
(d) "hit-andrun automobile" means an automobite which causes bodily
injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such auto-
mobile with the insured or with an automobile which the insured
is ocupying at the time of the accident, provided- (l there cannot
he ascertained the identdy of either the operator or owner of such
"hit-andrun a tomobile," 12) the insured or someone on his behalf
shal have rerorled the accident within 24 hours to a police, peace
or ludinoal oficer or to the Commissioner of totor Vehicles, and
shall have filed with the company within 30 days thereafter a state-
ment under oath that the insured or his legal representative has a
cause or causes of action arising out of such accident for damages
against a person or persons whose identity is unascertainahie, and
setting forth the facts in support thereof; and (3) at the company's
request. the insured or his legal represenlative mahes available or
inspection the automobile which the insured was occupying at the
time of the accident.
tOccupying. The word "occupying' means in or upon or entering
into or ahghting lrom.
If) State. The word "state" includes the District of Columbia, a
terrtry or possession of the United States, and a province ofCanada.
Ill. Policy Period. Territory: This endorsement applies only to accidents
wh,ch occur on and alter the effective date hereof during the policy
period and within the United States ol America, its territories or pos.
sessions, or Canada.
EXCLUSIOiS
This endorsement does rot apply; tiue resident in the same household, or through being stouck by
such an automobile. but this exclusion does not apply to the prin-
tat to bodily injury to an insured with respect to which such insured, cipal named insured or his relatives while occupying or if struck
his legal representative or any person entitled to payment under by an automobile owned by an insured named in the schedule or
this endorsement shall, without written consent of the company, his retatiues;
make any settlement with any person or organization who may be tnt so as to inure dinectty nr indireutty to the benetit ot any worhinen's
legally tiable therefor; compensation or disability benefits carrier or any person of organi.
IbI to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automohie (other zation qualhtying as a snftinsurer under airy woobmen's compensa-
than an insured automobilet owned by a named insured or any rela- tion or disability benetits law or any similar law.
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State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Policy
EXCLUSIONS -SECTION III
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY:
(a) TO BODILY INJURY TO AN INSURED, OR CARE
OR LOSS -OF SERVICES RECOVERABLE BY AN
INSURED, WITH RESPECT TO WHICH SUCH
INSURED, HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OR ANY
PERSON ENTITLED TO PAYMENT UNDER THIS
COVERAGE SHALL. WITHOUT WRITTEN CONSENT
OF THE COMPANY, MAKE ANY SETTLEMENT
WITH ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO
MAY BE LEGALLY LIABLE THEREFOR:
(b) TO BODILY INJURY TO AN INSURED WHILE
OCCUPYING OR THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY A
LAND MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY THE NAMED
INSURED OR ANY RESIDENT OF THE SAME
HOUSEHOLD, IF SUCH VEHICLE IS NOT AN
OWNED MOTOR VEHICLE;
(c) SO AS TO INURE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
TO THE BENEFIT OF ANY WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION OR DISABILITY BENEFITS
CARRIER OR ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION
QUALIFYING AS A SELF-INSURER UNDER ANY
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION OR DISABILITY
BENEFITS LAW OR ANY SIMILAR LAW.
LIMITS OF LIABILITY
(a) The limit of liability stated in the declarations
as applicable to "each person" is the limit of the
company's liability for all damages, including
damages for care and loss of services, arising out
of bodily injury sustained by one person in any one
accident, and subject to this provision, the limit of
liability stated in the declarations as applicable to
"each accident" is the total limit of the company's
liability for all such damages for bodily injury
sustained by two or more persons in any one
accident.
(b) Any amount payable under this coverage because
of bodily injury sustained in an accident by a person
who is an insured under this coverage shall be
reduced by:
(1) all sums paid on account of such bodily Injury
by or on behalf of
(i) the owner or operator of the uninsured
motor vehicle and
(ii) any other person or organization jointly or
severally liable together with such owner or
operator for such bodily injury including all
sums paid under coverage A:
(2) the amount paid and the present-value of all
amounts payable on account of such bodily injury
under any workmen's compensation law. disability
benefits law or any similar law:
(3) all sums paid or payable on account of such
bodily injury under coverages C and M of a policy
issued by this company.
(c) Any payment made hereunder to or for any
insured shall be applied in reduction of the amount
of damages which he may be entitled to recover
from any person who is an insured under coverage A.
DEFINITIONS - SECTION III
The definitions of Automobile, Bodily Injury, Newly
Acquired Automobile, Occupying, Owned Motor
Vehicle, Person, Resident and Temporary Substitute
Automobile under Section I apply to Section III and
under Section III:
Hit-and-Run Motor Vehicle-nmeans a land motor
vehicle which causes bodily injury to an insured
arising out of physical contact of such vehicle with
the insured or with a vehicle which the insured is
occupying at the time of the accident, provided:
(1) there cannot be ascertained the identity of
either the operator or owner of such hit-and-run
motor vehicle;
(2) the insured or someone on his behalf shall
have reported the accident within 24 hours to a
police or judicial officer or to the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles. and shall have filed with the
company within 30 days thereafter a statement
under oath that the insured or his legal
representative has a cause or causes of action
arising out of such accident for damages against
a person or persons whose identity is
unascertainable. and setting forth the facts in
support thereof: and
(3) at the company's request, the insured or his
legal representative makes available for inspection
the vehicle which the insured was occupying at the
time of the accident.
Insured-The unqualified word "insured" means
(1) the first person named in the declarations and
while residents of his household, his spouse and
the relatives of either;
(2) any other person while occupying an insured
automobile: and
(3) any person, with respect to damages he is
entitled to recover because of bodily injury to
which this coverage applies sustained by an insured
under (1) or (2) above.
Insured Automobile-means:
(1) an owned motor vehicle provided the use
thereof is by such first named insured or spouse
or any other person to whom such first named
insured or spouse has given permission to use
such vehicle if the use is within the scope of such
permission, or
(2) an automobile not owned by the nmed
insured or any resident of the same household.
other than a temporary substitute automobile.
while being operated by such first named insured
or spouse,
but the term insured eutomobile shall not include
any motor vehicle while being used as a public or
livery conveyance, or any motor vehicle while being
used without the permission of the owner.
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